（文章翻译）封建主义再辩论：拜占庭案例（一）

John Haldon. The feudalism debate once more: The case of Byzantium[J]. The Journal of Peasant Studies,1989(1). pp.5-40.

This article takes up one aspect of the debate on feudalism and non-European societies. Through a review of elements of the social and economic history of the late Roman and Byzantine states, it seeks to demonstrate, first, how and why these social formations should be considered feudal; second, that a broad application of the concept of the feudal mode of production as a concept of political economy is both theoretically more valid and analytically more fruitful than its restriction to the examination of types of society traditionally identified as feudal on the basis of their institutional and superstructural appearance. The crucial point in this context is the rigorous separation of concepts belonging to theoretical and heuristic categories such as mode of production from the forms which these concepts express in specific historical societies.

          本文讨论了关于封建主义和非欧洲社会的辩论的一个方面。通过对晚期罗马和拜占庭国家的社会和经济历史要素的回顾，文章试图证明：第一，这些社会形态如何以及为什么应该被认为是封建的；第二，将封建生产方式的概念作为政治经济学的一个概念来广泛运用，在理论上更有效，在分析上更有成果，而不是将其限制在对传统上根据其制度和上层建筑的外观而被认定为封建的社会类型的研究。在这种情况下，关键的一点是把属于理论和启发式范畴的概念，如生产方式，与这些概念在具体历史社会中所表现的形式严格分开。

第一部分

Debate among medievalists and others over the adequacy or not of concepts such as 'feudalism' has been part and parcel of the historiographical scene for decades. Between Marxists and their critics on the one hand, and among Marxists on the other, the discussion has focused on two themes. In the first place, do we need such categories? And in the second, on the basis of which criteria are they to be constructed, and how are they to be employed? In particular, the ways in which categories such as mode of production, or social formation, can be invoked to understand complex historical societies has been a central issue in the pages of this, as of many other, journals. In what follows, and bearing in mind the comparative nature of this debate and its relevance to understanding both the problems of transition in past social formations, as well as its own role in contemporary historical and political analysis, I shall concentrate on the second of these questions. And I shall have a specific historical problem in mind: namely, to what extent can the Byzantine empire, which dominated Asia Minor and the Balkans from the seventh to the thirteenth centuries, be described as feudal, and, concomitantly, what sort of state formation does it represent?

          几十年来，中世纪学者和其他人之间关于“封建主义”等概念是否充分的辩论一直是历史学界的组成部分。一方面在马克思主义者和他们的批评者之间，另一方面在马克思主义者之间，讨论集中在两个主题上。首先，我们是否需要这种分类？其次，根据什么标准来构建它们，以及如何使用它们？特别是，如何引用生产方式或社会形成等类别来理解复杂的历史社会，一直是本刊和其他许多期刊的核心问题。在下文中，考虑到这一辩论的比较性质及其与理解过去社会形态中的转型问题的相关性，以及它在当代历史和政治分析中的作用，我将集中讨论这些问题中的第二个。我将考虑一个具体的历史问题：即从七世纪到十三世纪统治小亚细亚和巴尔干地区的拜占庭帝国在多大程度上可以被描述为封建帝国，以及随之而来的——它代表了什么样的国家形态？

For the first of these questions is, I believe, easily answered: conceptual categories are heuristic devices, and they both establish the ways in which particular sorts of evidence can be invoked and made relevant to a problem, and avoid the subjective and intuition-bound nature of ad hoc hypothesising - however valuable a role this plays in all historical work. Not only Marxists have concepts, of course. But Marxism - or historical materialism - more than any other mode of interpreting human society, past and present, does offer the possibility of a holistic interpretative framework within which certain general principles of social and economic analysis can be employed, principles whose primary function is to enable the historian to focus on causal relationships in respect of both structures and events. In short, such categories are enabling devices which link understanding to action, and thereby to the potential for change.

           因为我相信，这些问题中的第一个很容易回答：概念类别是启发式装置，它们既确立了可以援引特定种类的证据并使之与问题相关的方式，又避免了临时假设的主观和直觉约束的性质——无论这在所有历史工作中发挥多么宝贵的作用。当然，不仅是马克思主义者有概念。但马克思主义（或历史唯物主义）比任何其他解释人类社会的模式——过去和现在，确实提供了一个整体解释框架的可能性，在这个框架内，可以采用某些社会和经济分析的一般原则，这些原则的主要功能是使历史学家能够专注于结构和事件方面的因果关系。简而言之，这些类别是将理解与行动联系起来的有利工具，从而与变革的潜力联系起来。

The second question, and the one which chiefly concerns me, has been answered from the theoretical and conceptual perspective by attempts to define more rigorously the concepts of various modes of production through which the social, economic and political structures of ancient and medieval societies can best be understood. This debate has linked in with discussion both inside and outside Marxism on the nature of ancient and medieval state formations and on the structure of pre-capitalist societies, viewed from a social-anthropological perspective. From the historical point of view, attention has centred on the question of the nature of the transition between ancient and medieval socio-economic and political structures, notably - and with an obviously Eurocentric bias — that from the ancient or post-classical world of the late Roman state (and the various cultures throughout the Mediterranean region which it subsumed) to the medieval and 'feudal' world of Europe after the fifth and sixth centuries. And it is within the context of these debates that I wish to concentrate on the history of the East Roman, or Byzantine, state.

          第二个问题，也是我最关心的问题，已经从理论和概念的角度得到了回答，即试图更严格地界定各种生产方式的概念，通过这些概念可以最好地理解古代和中世纪社会的社会、经济和政治结构。这场辩论与马克思主义内部和外部关于古代和中世纪国家形态的性质以及从社会人类学角度看前资本主义社会结构的讨论联系在一起。从历史的角度来看，注意力集中在古代和中世纪社会经济和政治结构之间的过渡性质问题上，特别是（而且明显带有欧洲中心主义的偏见）从古代或后罗马国家的古典世界（以及它所包含的整个地中海地区的各种文化）到五、六世纪后欧洲的中世纪和‘封建’世界。正是在这些争论的背景下，我希望集中讨论东罗马或拜占庭国家的历史。

Importantly for this discussion, Byzantium has come to represent for many, at least from the European perspective, the classic example of a social formation which failed conspicuously to develop 'full' feudal relations of production in the medieval period. Most western Byzantinists (the vast majority of them not being Marxists), indeed, refuse to concede that Byzantine society was ever feudal; or that, if it was, then only right at the end of its history, from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries on, and only as a result of western, that is to say, external, influence. In contrast, Soviet and East European historians have traditionally been divided into roughly two camps: those who see feudal relations already in the later Roman period (from the fifth century, but most clearly from the seventh); and those who find evidence for such relations only after the tenth and eleventh centuries. More recently, there has been some move towards accepting elements of the 'western' critique, and to push the development of 'full' feudal relations forward into the thirteenth century and after [Khvostova, 1980]. As we shall see, the premises upon which such reasoning is founded are open to criticism.

          对这次讨论较为重要的是，拜占庭对许多人来说，至少从欧洲的角度来看，是一个社会形态的典型例子，它未能在中世纪时期明显地发展“完全”的封建生产关系。事实上，大多数西方拜占庭主义者（其中绝大多数不是马克思主义者）拒绝承认拜占庭社会曾经是封建社会；或者说，如果它是封建社会，那也只是在其历史的末期，从第十二和第十三世纪开始，而且只是作为西方，也就是外部影响的结果。与此相反，苏联和东欧的历史学家传统上大致分为两个阵营：那些认为封建关系在罗马时期后期（从第五世纪开始，但最明显的是从第七世纪开始）就存在的人；以及那些在第十和第十一世纪之后才发现这种关系证据的人。最近，有一些人开始接受 “西方”批评的观点，并将“完整的”封建关系的发展提前到13世纪及之后[Khvostova, 1980]。正如我们将看到的，这种推理所依据的前提是可以批评的。

For the western historian of the Byzantine world, feudalism is defined chiefly in terms of legal-juridical structures of vassalage, enfeoffment, and so on, together with the supporting elements of dependent tenant or serf peasantries, and the fragmentation of judicial and political authority and powers. In other words, Byzantium cannot be considered feudal because its institutional and superstructural appearance never approximates to the appearance of western European feudalism in the tenth century and after. Non-Marxist western Byzantinists who do favour a feudal stage are usually constrained to place its inception in the eleventh century, with the appearance of the pronoia system, whereby the state granted the revenue from certain taxes or dues in particular areas, and for limited periods, to individuals in return for (predominantly) military service. But once again, the crucial determinant for a feudal order is the secondary institution of pronoia, in its judicial form, rather than any relation of production.

          对于拜占庭世界的西方历史学家来说，封建主义主要是指附庸制、分封制等法律-君主制结构，以及附属的佃农或农奴等支持性因素，以及司法和政治权威和权力的分散。换句话说，拜占庭不能被认为是封建的，因为它的制度和上层建筑的外观从未接近十世纪及以后的西欧封建主义的外观。赞成封建阶段的非马克思主义的西方拜占庭主义者通常被限制在11世纪，随着普洛尼亚制度的出现，国家将特定地区的某些税收或会费的收入在有限的时间内授予个人，作为对（主要是）军事服务的回报。但是，封建秩序的关键决定因素再次是司法形式的普洛尼亚二级机构，而不是任何生产关系。

Soviet and East European historiography has concentrated on the question of when Byzantine social relations became feudalised, and this has inevitably involved problematising the role and nature of the city in late Roman aad Byzantine society, as well as the ways in which the state and its institutions intervened at different levels of the social and economic formation. The two traditional positions, which are evident from the late 1950s to the present, can be represented most readily in the work of two scholars, Stajermann and Sjuzjumov.

          苏联和东欧的历史学集中研究了拜占庭社会关系何时变得封建化的问题，这不可避免地涉及到对罗马后期和拜占庭社会中城市的作用和性质的问题，以及国家及其机构在社会和经济形成的不同层面上的干预方式。从20世纪50年代末到现在，这两种传统的立场是显而易见的，可以在两位学者Stajermann（E. M. Stajerman）和Sjuzjumov（米哈伊尔·苏祖莫夫，师从亚历山大·瓦西列夫 ( Alexander Vasiliev )）的工作中得到最充分的体现。

Stajermann represents in many ways a Soviet version of Anderson's thesis, although pre-dating it by many years: namely, that feudalism in the West is the result of a synthesis of the Roman slave mode of production with the barbarian tribalism or primitive communalism of the Germanic invaders. In contrast, the Balkans and Anatolia moved directly from the slave mode to the feudal mode, without external stimulus, as the developing relations of landlord-tenant subordination were subsumed within the state's fiscal apparatus, so that the taxes raised by the state can in effect be seen as a centralised form of feudal rent [Stajermann, 1975].

          Stajermann在许多方面代表了安德森理论的苏联版本，尽管比它早了许多年：即西方的封建主义是罗马奴隶生产模式与日耳曼入侵者的野蛮部落主义或原始公社主义综合的结果。相反，巴尔干半岛和安纳托利亚在没有外部刺激的情况下，直接从奴隶模式进入封建模式，因为发展中的地主-佃户从属关系被归入国家的财政机构，所以国家筹集的税收实际上可以被看作是封建地租的集中形式[Stajermann, 1975]。

Sjuzjumov, in contrast, argued that this position denied the concept of revolutionary change altogether, erecting in its place a notion of mechanical synthesis. At the same time, he argued that it broadened the concept of the feudal mode to include virtually all forms of dependency and rent-extraction, and rendered it in consequence too general usefully to be employed in any analysis. According to Sjuzjumov, synthesis of a sort did occur in the West, but only at a much later date; while in the East the strength of the institutions of the ancient state, its ability to extract taxes, and the destruction of the large landholding elite from the seventh century on, delayed the development of feudal relations of production until, in the tenth century, a new class of landed magnates had arisen to challenge the state's interests in respect of the surpluses generated by the agricultural population of the empire. But their rise was itself promoted by the 'war economy' of the imperial state, which succumbed to feudalism chiefly because of the debilitating effects of constant warfare and the requirements of defence [Sjuzjumov, 1973b].

          相反，Sjuzjumov（米哈伊尔·苏祖莫夫）认为，这一立场完全否定了革命变革的概念，取而代之的是机械综合的概念。同时，他认为这扩大了封建模式的概念，几乎包括了所有形式的依赖和榨取租金，因此使它变得过于笼统，无法用于任何分析。根据Sjuzjumov的说法，在西方确实发生了某种综合，但只发生在更晚的时候；而在东方，古代国家机构的力量，其征税的能力，以及从七世纪开始对大土地拥有者精英的破坏，推迟了封建生产关系的发展，直到十世纪，一个新的土地大亨阶层出现，挑战国家在帝国农业人口产生的盈余方面的利益。但他们的崛起本身是由帝国的“战争经济”推动的，而帝国屈服于封建主义，主要是因为不断的战争和国防的要求造成的衰弱[Sjuzjumov, 1973b]。

Sjuzjumov's view in effect is that Byzantine society represented a stable combination of forces and relations of production, a combination destabilised by external forces [Sjuzjumov, 1976]. This is, it seems to me, a position which most Marxists would not wish to defend, at least in the stark way in which Sjuzjumov has presented it. Internal contradiction and class conflict - while they may certainly be either promoted or restrained by interventions external to the dynamic of the social-economic formation in question - are generally regarded as fundamental elements in promoting change, however refracted a form this may take through the prism of ideology and institutions.

          Sjuzjumov的观点，实际上是拜占庭社会代表了各种力量和生产关系的稳定组合，这种组合因外部力量而变得不稳定[Sjuzjumov, 1976]。在我看来，这是一个大多数马克思主义者不愿意捍卫的立场，至少在Sjuzjumov所提出的严酷方式下是如此。内部矛盾和阶级冲突（虽然它们肯定会被有关社会经济形态动态的外部干预所促进或抑制）通常被认为是促进变革的基本要素，无论这种变革通过意识形态和制度的棱镜会采取何种形式。

But another Soviet scholar, Alexander Kazhdan, has argued that it was precisely the internal contradictions of Byzantine society which explain its particular characteristics, a result of the impasse which he sees between developing feudal relations and the economic and ideological structures of the ancient centralised state [Kazhdan, 1968: 263ff.]. Kazhdan has also argued that, while neither feudal nor ancient relations of production were able to assert themselves fully until after the eleventh century (when feudalism finally becomes dominant), the taxes extracted by the ancient state did constitute already a form of centralised feudal rent [Kazhdan, 1956; I960]. But since tax represents a mode of surplus extraction, the particular form of which is in turn the hallmark of a particular mode of production, there arises a certain contradiction within his argument. I will return to this below.

          但另一位苏联学者亚历山大·卡日丹认为，正是拜占庭社会的内部矛盾解释了它的特殊性，这是他认为发展中的封建关系与古代中央集权国家的经济和意识形态结构之间的僵局的结果[卡日丹，1968：263ff]。卡日丹还认为，虽然封建和古代的生产关系在11世纪以后（封建主义最终成为主导）才得以充分体现，但古代国家征收的税收确实已经构成了一种中央集权的封建地租[Kazhdan, 1956; 1960]。但是，由于税收代表了一种剩余的提取方式，而这种方式的特殊形式又是一种特殊生产方式的标志，所以在他的论证中出现了某种矛盾。我将在下面回到这个问题。  

It is not my intention here to review the vast Soviet and East European literature concerned with these problems. But it is worth noting, finally, that - with the exception of the more recent work of Khvostova referred to already - the majority of Soviet scholars now seem to agree that the seventh century marks the end of the ancient world and the accompanying slave mode of production; that there followed a long period of pre- or proto-feudal development (as outlined by Kazhdan, for example), succeeded from the eleventh or the twelfth century by the full development of feudal relations of production. Within this schema, the debate has concentrated more recently on the question of whether or not tax is the equivalent of a form of centralised feudal rent; on the quantitative relationship between independent peasant cultivators and dependent tenants (whether of the state, Church or of private landlords); and on the process of the erosion of independent freeholdings and peasant communities subject directly to the fisc, in favour of the expansion of large estates and the gradual 'enserfment' of this formerly free peasantry. All seem agreed on the crucial role of the state in the development of Byzantine feudalism, especially on its role in patronising and promoting what becomes by the tenth and eleventh centuries the aristocracy, and its ability to hold back the extension of aristocratic landholding in the provinces - less consciously than through the inertia of the institutional apparatuses of fiscal and military administration. Many of these arguments would not be rejected by a large number of western and non-Marxist Byzantinists, either, and indeed, the final position is again not too far removed from that espoused by Anderson in his own survey [Anderson, 1974: 273ff.].

          我不打算在这里回顾有关这些问题的大量苏联和东欧文献。但值得注意的是，最后，除了已经提到的克谢尼亚·赫沃斯托娃的较新作品外，大多数苏联学者现在似乎都同意，七世纪标志着古代世界和伴随而来的奴隶生产方式的结束；随后是一个漫长的前或原封建发展时期（如卡日丹所概述的），从十一或十二世纪开始，封建生产关系全面发展。在这一模式中，最近的辩论集中在以下问题上：税收是否相当于一种集中的封建地租；独立的农民耕种者和附属佃户（无论是国家、教会还是私人地主）之间的数量关系；独立的自由所有权和直接受财政支配的农民群体被侵蚀的过程，而有利于大庄园的扩张和以前自由农民的逐渐“被奴役”。所有的人似乎都同意国家在拜占庭封建主义发展中的关键作用，特别是它在赞助和促使到10世纪和11世纪成为贵族的作用，以及它阻止贵族土地所有权在各省扩展的能力——并不是有意识地，而是通过财政和军事管理机构的惰性。其中许多论点也不会被大量的西方和非马克思主义的拜占庭主义者所拒绝，事实上，最后的立场又与安德森在他自己的调查中所支持的立场相差无几[Anderson, 1974: 273ff. ] 。

For western Marxists, too, the Byzantine state presents a number of problems. And part of the reason for these lies in exactly the problematic outlined in the recent discussion of the transition from the ancient to the feudal modes of production in the West, namely, the clear conceptualisation of how the feudal mode of production is to be understood in respect of the actual data at the disposal of the historian. Is tax to be assimilated to centralised feudal rent? Was it the institutional inertia of the state apparatuses which neutralised for so long the development of feudal relations of production? What role does ideology play in this picture? - a feature often deliberately avoided or denied any relevance in discussion over the ways in which a particular mode of production is articulated within historical social formations.

          对于西方马克思主义者来说，拜占庭国家也反映出了一些问题。而这些问题的部分原因恰恰在于最近关于西方从古代生产方式向封建生产方式过渡的讨论中所概述的问题，即就历史学家所掌握的实际数据而言，应如何理解封建生产方式的明确概念化。税收是否要被同化为集中的封建地租？是国家机关的制度惯性使封建生产关系的发展长期处于中立状态吗？意识形态在这种情况下起什么作用？在讨论特定生产方式在历史社会形态中的衔接方式时，意识形态常常被刻意回避或否认有任何意义。

第二部分

These questions represent several different levels of argument, of course: specifically, how is feudalism as a mode of production to be invoked? And, in the second place, how is the historical evidence relating to the specific history of the late Roman and Byzantine world to be understood in the light of any conclusions drawn in answer to the first question? I want, therefore, initially to confront what seems to me to be the most crucial: that is, how are we to understand phenomena such as tax (in its various forms) and rent (in its equally varied forms) as modes of surplus appropriation, and to what extent can either or both be subsumed within one or other of two headings: 'tribute' and '(centralised) feudal rent'.

          当然，这些问题代表了几个不同层次的争论：具体来说，如何引用封建主义作为一种生产方式？其次，根据对第一个问题的回答得出的任何结论，如何理解与罗马和拜占庭后期世界的具体历史有关的历史证据？因此，我想首先面对在我看来最关键的问题：即我们如何理解税收（各种形式）和地租（同样的各种形式）等现象作为剩余占有的模式，以及在多大程度上可以将两者或其中之一归入“贡品”和“（中央）封建地租”这两个标题中（的一个或另一个）。

In his article on 'the other transition', and more explicitly in that on 'the uniqueness of the East', Wickham [1984; 1985] argued for the notion of a tributary mode of production as proposed by Amin [1976:13ff.], intended to replace the concept of an asiatic mode of production (the latter now generally considered in western Marxism to be obsolescent, since rooted in misapprehensions and inadequate empirical data on the part of Marx and Engels), and to function as a concept within which localised subtypes, such as the ancient mode of production, could be accommodated. The crucial common element which Wickham identified in this mode was tax, a 'public' or 'state' method of surplus appropriation which differentiated it from the feudal mode, distinguished by feudal rent, that is to say, by (coercive) rent-taking, the extraction of surpluses from the direct producers based on extra-economic and 'private' power. At first glance, this distinction between tax and rent, as two different modes of surplus appropriation, seems convincing, and certainly fits the historical data for the political transition in Europe from ancient to feudal society - rent being the hallmark of feudalism, tax of the ancient (the Roman) state.

          在他关于“另一种过渡”的文章中，以及更明确地在关于“东方的独特性”的文章中，克里斯·威克姆[1984；1985]赞成阿明的主张[1976：13ff. ]，旨在取代亚洲生产方式的概念(后者现在在西方马克思主义中被普遍认为是过时的，因为它植根于马克思和恩格斯的错误理解和不充分的经验数据)，并作为一个概念，在其中可以容纳本地化的亚类型，如古代生产方式。威克姆在这种模式中确定的关键共同要素是税收，这是一种“公共”或“国家”的剩余占有方法，它与封建模式不同，后者以封建地租为特征，也就是说，以（强制）收租为特征，根据经济以外和“私人”权力从直接生产者那里提取剩余物。乍一看，税收和地租之间的这种区别，作为两种不同的剩余占有模式，似乎令人信服，而且肯定符合欧洲从古代社会向封建社会政治过渡的历史数据——地租是封建主义的标志，税收是古代（罗马）国家的标志。

In a forensic critique of Wickham's views, Berktay has argued instead that tax and rent are merely two variants of the same mode of surplus appropriation, feudal rent (that is to say, the general form of surplus appropriation consistent with non-capitalist agricultural exploitation in a class society); so that, as a result, the feudal mode can be seen as the dominant mode throughout much of the pre-capitalist world. This view finds support in some traditional Marxist thinking, of course, as well as in the writings of Marx and Engels themselves (although, as is well known, neither ever developed an explicit theory of either modes of production or the process of transition from one mode to another within specific social formations). As Marx said:

          It is furthermore evident that in all forms in which the direct labourer remains the 'possessor* of the means of production and labour conditions necessary for the production of his own means of subsistence, the property relationship must simultaneously appear as a direct relationship of lordship and servitude, so that the direct producer is not free; a lack of freedom which may be reduced from serfdom with enforced labour to a mere tributary relationship (my emphasis).

          在对威克姆的观点进行取证批判时，Berktay反而认为，税收和地租只是同一剩余占有模式的两个变种，即封建地租（也就是说，与阶级社会中的非资本主义农业剥削相一致的剩余占有的一般形式）；因此，封建模式可以被看作是整个前资本主义世界的主导模式。当然，这种观点在一些传统的马克思主义思想以及马克思和恩格斯自己的著作中找到了支持论点（尽管众所周知，两人都没有发展出关于生产模式或在具体社会形态中从一种模式过渡到另一种模式过程的明确理论）。正如马克思所说：

          此外，显而易见的是，在直接劳动者仍然是生产自己生活资料所必需的生产资料和劳动条件的“拥有者”的所有形式中，财产关系必须同时表现为一种直接的领主和奴役关系，因此，直接生产者是不自由的；这种不自由可以从强制劳动的农奴制沦为一种单纯的支派关系（我的强调）。

It seems to me that, if we are to retain the concept of mode of surplus appropriation as a fundamental element which serves to differentiate one mode of production from another, then this is a crucial point. For both the couplet tax/rent and the notion of a tributary mode are, in fact, expressions of the political-juridical forms that surplus appropriation takes, not distinctions between different modes. Both tax and rent are forms of surplus appropriation based upon the existence of a peasant producing class occupying and exploiting its holdings — whether these peasants are dependent tenants leasing their lands merely as exploiters, not as owners, whether they are free proprietors grouped in independent village communities, or a mixture of varying degrees of the two (as in the later Roman and Byzantine world from the third to the twelfth centuries), is not important. Nor are the origins of their economic and juridical condition: what matters for our point is the process through which surpluses are actually extracted by the state or by a private landlord. This is where I believe Cohen to be wrong in his critique of Hilton, for example, since the genesis of relations of surplus appropriation, while it may retain a juridical and ideological status specific to the legal and political apparatuses of a social-cultural formation, cannot adequately be employed to understand the actual process of exploitation.

           在我看来，如果我们要保留剩余占有模式的概念，将其作为区分一种生产方式和另一种生产方式的基本要素，那么这就是一个关键点。因为税/租的对联和支流模式的概念，实际上都是对剩余占有的政治-司法形式的表达，而不是对不同模式的区分。税收和地租都是剩余占有的形式，其基础是占有和剥削其土地的农民生产阶级的存在——无论这些农民是仅仅作为剥削者而不是作为所有者租赁其土地的附属租户，无论他们是独立的村社中的自由业主，还是两者不同程度的混合体（如第三至第十二世纪的后期罗马和拜占庭世界），都不重要。他们的经济和司法状况的起源也不重要：对我们来说，重要的是国家或私人地主实际提取盈余的过程。这就是我认为科恩在他对希尔顿的批评中的错误之处，例如，因为剩余物占有关系的起源，虽然它可能保留了一个社会文化形成的法律和政治机构所特有的司法和意识形态地位，但不能充分地用于理解实际的剥削过程。

Now it is clear that both the extraction of rent, on the one hand, and of tax, on the other, is achieved by means other than economic pressure (in contrast to capitalist exploitation). As Marx put it in respect of feudal rent, its foundation was the 'forcible domination of one section of society over another', secured by both actual or potential violence, that is, by physical force and by ideology. This, of course, represents something fundamentally different from slavery or the slave mode of production, where human beings are treated as chattels, as (potential) commodities, being both separated absolutely, as the property of their owners, from the means of production, and therefore without any means of subsistence or reproduction except those granted by their owners; it is equally very different from capitalist production, where labourers have complete possession only of their labour power, being forced (and this by economic pressure) to sell this as a commodity to the owners of the means of production. But it represents no real opposition between tax and rent, which are valences of the same essential relationship: between a power (authority) on the one side, able to enforce the exaction of surpluses by virtue of custom, legal relationships, contractual arrangements backed up by sanctions or simple bullying enshrined in traditional rights and dues; and on the other side, the free or not so free peasant producers, possessing, if not actually owning, their own means of subsistence and reproduction.

          现在很清楚的是，一方面提取地租，另一方面提取税收，都是通过经济压力以外的手段实现的（与资本主义剥削相反）。正如马克思在谈到封建地租时所说，它的基础是“社会的一个部分对另一个部分的强行统治”，通过实际的或潜在的暴力，即通过物质力量和意识形态来保证。当然，这代表了与奴隶制或奴隶生产方式的根本不同，在奴隶制中，人被当作动产，作为（潜在的）商品，作为其所有者的财产，与生产资料绝对分离，因此，除了其所有者授予的手段外，没有任何生存或再生产的手段；它同样与资本主义生产不同，在资本主义生产中，劳动者只完全拥有其劳动能力，被迫（而且是通过经济压力）将其作为商品出售给生产资料所有者。但它并不代表税收和地租之间的真正对立，它们是同一基本关系的表征：一方是权力（当局），能够凭借习俗、法律关系、以制裁为后盾的合同安排或传统权利和义务中所载的简单欺凌来强制征收盈余；另一方是自由或不太自由的农民生产者，他们拥有（如果不是实际拥有）自己的生存和再生产手段。

Indeed, Marx makes explicit reference to the fact that his concept of rent is a general concept of political economy, rather than a narrow and legalistic definition: labour rent, rent in kind, money rent and tax are all forms of the expression of unpaid surplus labour in pre-capitalist economic formations. And it is clear that where rent on peasant freeholdings is not paid, then tax is its political economy equivalent. The stress Marx places on the difference between serfs or tenants of a private landlord on the one hand, and those for whom the state functions in effect as a landlord on the other, reflects his own tendency to attribute more critical weight to legal forms of possession and/or property than the variety of historical forms always justifies. It seems clear that no real contradiction exists between the mode of appropriation of rent and tax: terms such as 'lack of freedom', 'bondage', 'landlord', for example, have different nuances according to the context in which they appear in Marx's writings: 'should the direct producers not be confronted by a private landowner, but rather ... under direct subordination to a state which stands over them as their landlord and simultaneously as sovereign, then rent and taxes coincide, or rather, there exists no tax which differs from this form of ground-rent' [Marx, 1894/1974: 790].

           事实上，马克思明确提到，他的地租概念是政治经济学的一般概念，而不是狭义的和法律上的定义：劳动租金、实物租金、货币租金和税收都是前资本主义经济形态中无偿剩余劳动的表现形式。而且很明显的是，如果不支付农民自由产权的租金，那么税收就是其政治经济的等同物。马克思强调农奴或私人地主的租户与国家实际上作为地主的人之间的区别，反映了他自己的倾向，即对占有和/或财产的法律形式给予更多的批评权重，而不是历史形式的多样性证明。显然，在租金和税收的占有模式之间不存在真正的矛盾：例如“缺乏自由”、“束缚”、“地主”等术语，根据它们在马克思著作中出现的背景，有不同的细微差别：“直接生产者不应该面对私人地主，而应该......直接服从于私人地主。如果直接生产者不是面对私人土地所有者，而是......直接服从于作为他们的地主并同时作为主权者站在他们头上的国家，那么，地租和税收是一致的，或者说，不存在与这种形式的地租不同的税收”[马克思，1894/1974：790]。

Of course, the actual conditions in which coercion occurs, and which make possible its continuation, are centrally relevant to the ways in which the claims to the appropriation of wealth are enforced and validated. But these can take a multiplicity and variety of forms and, while they are crucial to the process of the reproduction of the social relations of production in a specific historical context, are still not a part of the economic relation of appropriation. Similarly, tax exists in modern states, too, yet it is once again not a determining feature of the mode of surplus appropriation. In capitalism, tax is imposed upon, and is secondary to, the actual process of surplus appropriation in capitalist production relations. In pre-capitalist social formations not dominated by slavery, tax and rent are the only forms that the appropriation of surpluses can take.

          当然，胁迫发生的实际条件，以及使胁迫得以继续的实际条件，与对财富的占有要求的实施和确认的方式有核心关系。但是，这些条件可以采取多种多样的形式，虽然它们对社会生产关系在特定历史背景下的再生产过程至关重要，但仍然不是占有的经济关系的一部分。同样，税收也存在于现代国家，但它又不是剩余占有模式的决定性特征。在资本主义中，税收是强加于资本主义生产关系中实际的剩余占有过程，而且是次要的。在不以奴隶制为主导的前资本主义社会形态中，税收和地租是剩余物占有的唯一形式。

The functional economic equivalence of forms of tax and forms of rent in pre-capitalist social formations has been pointed out by many historians; and it seems to me that the reluctance of many others to accept this as fundamental to a vast range of actual social formations in the historical past is based less on the lack of a logical appreciation of its value than a tendency and a desire to incorporate elements which are in essence superstructural and conjunctural into what should remain a basically descriptive and heuristic model of economic relationships: a mode of production, as many who are aware of this point out (while then slipping into the same pattern of thinking) is not a concrete social reality. This is, for example, the problem with Sjuzjumov's critique of Stajermann, since he incorporated a range of non-economic elements, such as the forms of the state apparatuses which facilitated surplus appropriation, into what should be a strictly economic concept.

          许多历史学家已经指出，在前资本主义社会形态中，税收形式和地租形式在经济上是等同的；在我看来，许多人不愿意接受这一点，认为它是历史上大量实际社会形态的基础，这与其说是基于对其价值缺乏逻辑上的理解，不如说是基于一种倾向和愿望，即把本质上是上层建筑的和偶发的因素纳入基本上应该是描述性和启发式的经济关系模式。正如许多意识到这一点的人所指出的那样（同时也陷入了同样的思维模式），生产方式不是一种具体的社会现实。例如，这就是Sjuzjumov对Stajermann的批评的问题，因为他把一系列非经济因素，如促进剩余占有的国家机构的形式，纳入了应该是一个严格的经济概念。

Within feudal relations of production, therefore, we must be prepared to differentiate empirically between a wide range of disparate sub-types, actual social formations with very different histories and trajectories of development, different superstructural characteristics, different modes of self-expression. But this also means seeing very clearly that the word feudal continues to be employed because it is a historically-determined, convenient label — again, reluctance to accept its wider application is clearly bound up with a (mostly) eurocentric historiographical semantics which hankers after a historically-specific descriptive correspondence between a technical term and the categories to which it is applied. 'Feudalism' is still a term which invokes particular historico-social formations. Should we try to think up an alternative?

          因此，在封建生产关系中，我们必须准备从经验上区分各种不同的子类型，具有非常不同的历史和发展轨迹的实际社会形态，不同的上层建筑特征，不同的自我表达模式。但这也意味着要清楚地看到，封建这个词之所以继续被采用，是因为它是一个由历史决定的、方便的标签；同样，不愿意接受其更广泛的应用显然与（主要是）欧洲中心主义的历史语义学联系在一起，它渴望在一个技术术语和它所适用的类别之间有一个历史上特定的描述性对应。“封建主义”仍然是一个调用特定历史-社会形态的术语。我们是否应该尝试想出一个替代方案？

Two results follow these conclusions. The first is that most ancient societies which had moved out of the stage of kinship-based or 'primitive communal' exploitation (whether 'urban' or not) and developed a class structure based upon the differential relationships of various socioeconomic groups economically to the means of production and distribution, can be understood through the category of the feudal mode of production; second, that the slave mode of production, which is now generally recognised to have had a relatively limited chronological and geographical dominance in the ancient world in those periods when it did develop, can be seen generally as a much more volatile and contingency bound mode of surplus appropriation. This has not yet, it seems to me, had the recognition it deserves; so that Soviet historians, for example, continue to describe the ancient world in the West almost exclusively in terms of the slave mode of production, a position which often seems both forced and the result of considerable over-generalisation. Slavery did dominate relations of production at times in the late Roman republic and early principate (but chiefly in Italy) and in Greece in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. (in certain city-states); and because of the nature of this slavery - intensive agricultural plantation labour - it has been argued that it is reasonable to define the pre-Hellenistic Greek world, or the late republic and early empire of Rome, as dominated by the slave mode at times [Wickham, 1985: 187-9]. But the contradictions within this type of slave exploitation are such that it seems always to have given way to more reliable and less unstable (if also less profitable in the short term) forms of exploitation. And contrary to the views of Stajermann and many others, the late Roman state was certainly not representative of such a slave-dominated conjuncture.

          这些结论之后有两个结果。第一，大多数古代社会已经走出了以亲属关系为基础的或“原始社区”的剥削阶段（无论是否形成“城市”），并形成了以各种社会经济群体在经济上对生产和分配手段的不同关系为基础的阶级结构，这些社会可以通过封建生产方式的范畴来理解。第二，现在普遍认为，在古代世界中，奴隶制生产方式在时间和地理上的主导地位相对有限，在它发展的那些时期，可以被普遍看作是一种更加不稳定和受偶然因素约束的剩余占有模式。在我看来，这一点还没有得到应有的承认；因此，比如说，苏联的历史学家们仍然几乎完全以奴隶生产方式来描述西方的古代世界，这种立场往往显得很勉强，也是过度概括的结果。在罗马共和国后期和公国早期（但主要是在意大利）以及公元前五世纪和四世纪的希腊（在某些城邦），奴隶制确实有时主导着生产关系；由于这种奴隶制的性质——密集的农业种植劳动，有人认为，将希腊前希腊世界或罗马共和国后期和帝国早期定义为有时由奴隶制模式所主导是合理的[Wickham, 1985: 187-9]。但这种类型的奴隶剥削中的矛盾是，它似乎总是让位于更可靠和更不稳定（如果在短期内也不那么有利可图）的剥削形式。与Stajermann和其他许多人的观点相反，晚期罗马国家肯定不是这种奴隶主导的时代的代表。

Equally, it becomes impossible to talk of the 'ancient mode in its class form', as does Wickham in his stimulating piece on the transition to feudalism, and as I have done myself using a slightly different terminology [Wickham, 1984: 6; Haldon, 1985: 104ff.]. For the ancient mode, as picked out by Hindess and Hirst, for example, is no more than an urban variant on the theme of primitive communal exploitation, in which clanand kinship-relations determine access to land or to other forms of wealth and to the exploitation of resources Marx had in mind the early city-states of the Mediterranean world as the developed and urbanocentric form of this still basically agrarian community, whose state represented the incorporation of the citizen body as a group of landowners with collective rights in public lands. The exploitation of citizens by other citizens and by the state takes place in the first instance through the collective appropriation of surpluses for common purposes - such as defence, for example. But as warfare brings slavery into the equation, along with other forms of social and economic subordination within the citizen community, so the division of labour becomes more complex, and the appearance of class antagonisms marks a new stage, indeed a transformative one, in the development of the relations of production. As objective antagonisms between social groups with regard to their different relationships to the means of production evolve, so the state becomes the legislative and executive arm of the ruling class of citizens, which can exploit it thereafter to maintain and further their own class interests and the extraction of surpluses (often in the form of tax in historical examples).

          同样，也不可能像威克姆在他关于向封建主义过渡的刺激性文章中所说的那样，谈论“阶级形式的古代模式”，而我自己也使用了稍微不同的术语[Wickham, 1984: 6; Haldon, 1985: 104ff. ] 。例如，Hindess和Hirst指出的古代模式不过是原始社区剥削主题的城市变体，其中宗族和亲属关系决定了获得土地或其他形式的财富以及对资源的利用，马克思想到了地中海世界的早期城邦，作为这种基本上仍然是农业社区的发达和城市中心的形式，其国家代表了公民团体作为拥有公共土地集体权利的土地所有者群体的纳入。其他公民和国家对公民的剥削，首先是通过集体占有盈余用于共同目的（例如国防）而发生的。但是，随着战争将奴隶制与公民社区内其他形式的社会和经济从属关系带入等式，劳动分工变得更加复杂，阶级对立的出现标志着生产关系发展的一个新阶段，实际上是一个变革阶段。随着社会群体之间关于他们与生产资料的不同关系的客观对立的发展，国家也就成为公民统治阶级的立法和行政部门，此后他们可以利用国家来维护和推进他们自己的阶级利益和榨取盈余（在历史的例子中经常以税收的形式）。

But as soon as a society has attained this stage, of course, it can properly be said to have transformed its relations of production, and more especially, the mode of appropriation of surpluses. No longer does the community, whatever kinship and lineage structures it still exhibits, control the means of production as a community (of families or clans, for example, within which other forms of non-economic subordination existed) with equal, or at least equivalent, rights in their exploitation and distribution. Instead, one group can now exert control over both the rate of exploitation (that is, the amount of surplus demanded) and the mode of surplus appropriation. By invoking the various instruments of noneconomic coercion (the law, customary practice, military force, and so on), one group, a class in the economic sense, exploits the labour of other groups. Whether this is referred to under terms which may be rendered as one or another form of tax or rent or tribute makes no difference. The 'ancient mode in its class form', therefore, is not a mode of production at all, but an example of a specific historical social formation in which both the slave mode and the feudal mode were represented, and according to the local context and other conditions, in which now one, now another (but finally the feudal mode) came to dominate. The role of the state is, as we shall see, crucial in this respect - but this is a story of a specific historical variant on the combination of modes, not of the development of a particular mode of production.

         当然，只要一个社会达到了这个阶段，就可以说它已经改变了它的生产关系，特别是改变了对剩余物的占有方式。无论社区仍然表现出什么样的亲属关系和世系结构，它都不再作为一个社区（例如家庭或宗族，其中存在着其他形式的非经济从属关系）控制生产资料，并在其利用和分配方面享有平等或至少是同等的权利。相反，一个群体现在可以对剥削率（即要求的剩余数量）和剩余占有的方式进行控制。通过援引各种非经济胁迫手段（法律、习惯做法、军事力量等），一个群体，即经济意义上的一个阶级，剥削其他群体的劳动。这是否被称为一种或另一种形式的税收或租金或贡品，并无区别。因此，“阶级形式的古代模式”根本不是一种生产模式，而是一个具体的历史社会形态的例子，其中奴隶模式和封建模式都有代表，并且根据当地的环境和其他条件，现在是一个，不久是另一个（但最后是封建模式）占主导地位。正如我们看到的，国家的作用在这方面至关重要，但这是一个关于模式组合的具体历史变体的故事，而不是一个特定生产模式的发展。

So far, I have been speaking about only one aspect of the equation 'mode of production', albeit the single most important distinguishing feature of each different mode - together with the way in which the direct producers are combined with the means of production, these were the two key features which differentiated modes for Marx, a point stressed by Berktay. And in respect of the ancient mode as it is usually understood, the development of classes, that is to say, a shift in the relations of production from non-class-based to class-based exploitation must also be commensurate with a shift in mode of production. One mode cannot encompass both forms.

          到目前为止，我只谈到了“生产方式”这个等式的一个方面，尽管这是每个不同模式的唯一最重要的区别特征——与直接生产者与生产资料相结合的方式一起，这是区分马克思模式的两个关键特征，这是Berktay强调的一点。而就通常理解的古代模式而言，阶级的发展，也就是生产关系从非阶级的剥削转向阶级的剥削，也必须与生产方式的转变相适应。一种模式不可能包含两种形式。

As has often been pointed out, of course, an apparently strong objection to the use of the term feudalism to define the mode of production dominant in such a vast range of actual social formations which this line of reasoning must imply (ranging from those of classical antiquity to some contemporary societies) is that it is so broad as to deprive it of any analytical value. But the difficulty with this argument is that its proponents have without exception tried to elaborate alternatives by bringing into the picture a range of elements which are, in fact, conjunctural and determined by actual historical specificities: a particular type of state fiscal administration, specific (legalistic) forms of landlord-tenant relationship, culture-bound definitions of 'free' and 'unfree', and so on. This is true of both Sjuzjumov and Kazdan, for example. The latter, who is aware of the convergence of tax and rent as forms of the same essential mode of surplus appropriation, nevertheless is unwilling to concede 'real' feudalism in Byzantium until the eleventh century or so - that is, until the dominance of a class of magnates was assured and the beginnings of a western-style institutional feudalism had appeared [Kazdan, 1968: 1974]. The same, of course, applies to Anderson in his account of the difference between the feudal West and the Byzantine, and non-feudal, East, as it does to Wickham in his differentiation between tax and rent - these are not differences between modes of surplus appropriation, they are differences in the forms one particular mode, the feudal mode, takes in specific historical formations. Similarly, the Soviet scholar Litavrin concedes feudalism in Byzantium only from the eleventh century and after; but it is an institutional feudalism whose phenomenal forms can be compared with those of the medieval West, which he sees. And, of course, it goes without saying that, if the feudal mode of production is our concern, as opposed to a western-style feudal social formation (one variant among many), then western, non-Marxist Byzantinists are also wrong to deny a Byzantine feudalism.

          正如人们经常指出的那样，对于使用封建主义一词来定义在如此广泛的实际社会形态中占主导地位的生产方式，这种推理方式必须意味着（从古典古代的社会形态到一些当代社会），一个明显的强烈反对意见是，它太广泛了，以至于使它失去了任何分析价值。但这一论点的困难在于，它的支持者无一例外地试图通过将一系列事实上是偶然的、由实际历史具体情况决定的因素带入画面来阐述替代方案：一种特殊类型的国家财政管理、特定的（法律上的）地主-佃户关系形式、受文化约束的“自由”和“不自由”的定义，等等。例如，苏祖莫夫和卡日丹的情况都是如此。后者意识到税收和地租的趋同是同一基本的剩余占有模式的形式，但他不愿意承认拜占庭的“真正的”封建主义，直到11世纪左右，也就是说，直到一个新贵族阶层的统治地位得到保证，西式制度的封建主义的雏形已经出现[卡日丹，1968：1974]。当然，这也适用于安德森对西方封建和东方拜占庭以及非封建的区别的论述，就像适用于威克姆对税收和地租的区分一样，这些不是剩余占有模式的区别，它们是一种特定模式（封建模式）在具体历史形态中所采取的形式的区别。同样，苏联学者Litavrin承认拜占庭的封建主义只是从11世纪及以后开始的；但这是一种制度性的封建主义，其现象形式可以与中世纪西方的封建主义相比较，他看到了这一点。当然，不言而喻，如果封建生产方式是我们关注的问题，而不是西式的封建社会形态（众多变体中的一种），那么西方的、非马克思主义的拜占庭主义者否认拜占庭的封建主义也是错误的。

It needs to be said, finally, that once a feudal mode of production comes to be the dominant mode of production in any given social formation, there may well be a general tendency towards the evolution of institutional forms which, given time and the appropriate conditions, will tend to approximately the same functional structure and appearance in different societies - the development of fiefs, for example, the parcellisation, or 'privatisation', of various degrees of sovereignty and jurisdictional or fiscal competences, and so forth. This is, after all, the case with the capitalist mode of production, both in respect of general economic evolution and the particular forms which evolve to express those developments. But the fact that these were not yet present, or were prevented from ever fully working themselves out, for whatever reasons (and as in Byzantium, for example), does not mean that the relations of production as such, as opposed to these institutional forms, are not feudal. And it must be obvious that the incorporation of such institutional phenomena into the definition of a mode of production immediately conflates two levels of analysis - abstract and concrete - as well as promoting the proliferation of an ever wider range of modes of production, or sub-modes (indeed, potentially as many modes as there are historically determinate social formations), instead of encouraging the analysis of the specific forms which the combination of different modes of production in concrete circcumstances actually takes. When this happens, of course, any difference between a Marxist and a non-Marxist analysis vanishes.

          最后需要指出的是，一旦封建生产方式成为任何特定社会形态中的主导生产方式，就很可能出现一种制度形式演变的一般趋势，如果有时间和适当的条件，这些制度形式在不同的社会中会趋向于大致相同的功能结构和外观。例如，封地的发展，各种程度的主权和司法或财政权限的分散化或‘私有化’，等等。这毕竟是资本主义生产方式的情况，无论是在一般的经济演变方面，还是在表达这些发展的特殊形式方面，都是如此。但是，无论出于什么原因（例如在拜占庭），这些东西还没有出现，或者被阻止完全发挥作用，并不意味着生产关系本身，相对于这些制度形式，不是封建的。显然，将这种制度现象纳入生产方式的定义，立即混淆了两个层次的分析(抽象的和具体的)以及促进了越来越多的生产方式或子模式的扩散（实际上，可能有多少模式就有多少历史上确定的社会形态），而不是鼓励分析不同生产方式在具体情况下的组合所实际采取的具体形式。当然，当这种情况发生时，马克思主义和非马克思主义分析之间的任何区别都会消失。

It seems to me that objections to a wider application of the concept of the feudal mode of production are groundless if we recall that the whole point of correctly elaborating the concept of a specific mode of production is to facilitate a better understanding of the wide range of historical social formations in which it occurred, that is, by enabling the right questions to be asked about their internal articulation, ideological and institutional structures, and so on; and not simply in order to erect an internally consistent but entirely abstract model. This is something which Marx himself emphasised more than once:

          ... events strikingly analagous but taking place in different surroundings led to totally different results. By studying each of these forms of evolution separately and then comparing them one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon, but one will never arrive there by using as one's master key a general philosophic historical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical, ...

          在我看来，如果我们回顾一下，正确阐述特定生产方式的概念的全部意义在于促进更好地理解它所发生的广泛的历史社会形态，也就是说，通过使人们能够提出有关其内部衔接、意识形态和制度结构等方面的正确问题，而不仅仅是为了建立一个内部一致但完全抽象的模式，那么反对更广泛地应用封建生产方式的概念是毫无根据的。这是马克思本人不止一次强调的东西:

          ......事件惊人地相似，但发生在不同的环境中，导致了完全不同的结果。通过分别研究这些演变的每一种形式，然后对它们进行比较，人们可以很容易地找到这种现象的线索，但如果把一般的哲学历史理论作为自己的万能钥匙，就永远不会到达那里，这种理论的最高优点在于它是超历史的，......

未完待续！（超字数了，放在下一篇）